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THE HISTORY OF THE CITY OF BOSTON

From its first settlement in 1630 to the present time.

By SAMUEL JOHNSON, Esq.

Vol. I.

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The War

VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK OF CHINA

On February 17, 1943 the White House announced that the President and Mrs. Roosevelt and a representative of the Department of State met Madame Chiang Kai-shek, wife of the Generalissimo of China, at the Union Station when she arrived in Washington late that afternoon. Madame Chiang was driven to the White House where she was to be a family guest. She was accompanied by her niece, Miss Jeanette Kung, and her nephew, Mr. L. K. Kung. They were guests at a family dinner with the President and Mrs. Roosevelt on the evening of February 17. Madame Chiang had been spending the past six days at Hyde Park, the President's home in New York.

[Released to the press by the White House February 19]

At his press conference at the White House on February 19 the President made the following informal remarks in presenting the newspaper correspondents to Madame Chiang Kai-shek:

"May I take this opportunity, not to introduce Madame Chiang to you but to present all of you to her.

"Madame Chiang, this is nearly our one-thousandth press conference in ten years, and the fact that the press and I are not only on speaking terms after all those years is perhaps a very good sign. We still talk to each other. I think we rather like each other.

"You have got a very representative group here. There is no country in the world, I think, that has more newspapers on a population basis—and magazines—than we have. They are very live wires. But I can tell the press some-

thing besides that, and that is that I wish we—the press and myself—knew half as much about China as Madame Chiang knows about us, as a special envoy. That is very different from most special envoys who come to this country. Her visit to us is going to be of real help in the days to come, not only because I suppose the people of China and the people of the United States for a very great number of years—well over a century—have been, in thought and in objective, closer to us Americans than almost any other peoples in the world. That is because we have the same great ideals.

"China, in the last—less than half—century has become one of the great democracies of the world, and we must remember always that her civilization is thousands of years older than ours. And that is why I feel that we in this country have a great deal more to learn about China than China has to learn about us.

"Madame Chiang knows this country, and I am going to ask her, therefore, as an old friend just to say a few words. And afterward, remember always, please, that this conference is not quotable for either of us—in other words, treat it just as if it were any regular conference of mine. You will receive her, and perhaps she will be willing to answer a few questions of the 'non-catch' type.

"And so I present to you the American press."

In response, Madame Chiang made the following informal remarks:

"MR. PRESIDENT, MRS. ROOSEVELT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE PRESS:

"I haven't made any preparations for a speech. I don't know what I am supposed to

say to you today, but I confess that I have often heard that the pen is mightier than the sword. And when I saw all those pencils flashing across the pages as the President spoke, I must confess that whereas I have been to all the fronts in China and have never felt any fear so far as Japanese swords are concerned, I do not know whether I felt fear or not when I saw all your pencils flashing across the pages.

"However, I don't think I do, because I see flashes of smiles coming from your faces, so I feel that I am amongst friends and that I have nothing to fear from the Press, although I understand that there are such questions as 'catch' questions. I don't think you are going to heckle me with them. I am sure you won't.

"I want to say one thing to you, and that is that we in China have always had social democracy through these thousands of years and that

we are now depending on our Press, now and in the future, so that in time we shall really realize not only social democracy but political democracy as well; because, as I said, the pen is mightier than the sword, and from what I have seen of your American Press, I am sure that our hopes for the Chinese Press will also be realized.

"I am particularly referring to the President's trip to Casablanca. I am sure that all of you knew about it, and yet there was not a single word in the Press about it. And I think that shows beautiful cooperation between the Administration and the Press. And it is particularly necessary, during these war days, that there should be such cooperation. I want to congratulate you on your tact and on your integrity.

"Thank you."

ADDRESS BY THE FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN¹

[Released to the press February 16]

Visiting Nashville, observing this beautiful capital, talking with your governor and other high officials, I have found myself impressed by your city—impressed not only because of its handsome natural setting, its splendid architecture, its industrious people, but impressed most of all by the spirit of free government and civic unity which I observe.

Free government and civic unity: do you realize how much they mean to us in our war against the German Reich and the Japanese Empire? Free government is something which we all want and all understand; but civic unity is the supreme duty which accompanies the supreme right of self-government. I do not mean the external support which you give to the war. I mean the inward unity which you display in living, working, and striving together toward one all-important common aim: attack for victory!

¹ Delivered by the Honorable Joseph C. Grew, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, under the auspices of the Office of Civilian Defense at Nashville, Tenn., Feb. 16, 1943.

The federal states of the German republic have gone into the grasp of Nazi *Statthalters*, arbitrary satraps of their ruthless Führer. The Imperial Japanese Diet, or parliament, has this very month progressed further toward wiping out the rights and prerogatives of the cities and prefectures of Japan. Compare this with America, where our 49 governments work together for the common victory. National rights and States' rights have become American rights; all stand or fall together. It could not be otherwise, when you consider what enemies and what dangers we face. Let me tell you something about that enemy which I happen to know best: Japan.

Even before Pearl Harbor, Japan was strong and possessed a military machine of great power—and when I speak of that military machine I include all branches of the Japanese armed forces: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. That military machine had been steadily strengthened and developed during many years, especially since Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, an act of unprovoked aggression which, in effect, commenced the expansionist movement of Japan in total disregard of the

rights and legitimate interests of any nation or of any people that might stand in the way of that movement. In 1937 came Japan's invasion of north China and Shanghai, which led to the past six years of Sino-Japanese warfare. The Japanese did not wish to clothe that infamous campaign with the name of war: they called it first the "China Incident", and later, when great Japanese armies were trying desperately but futilely, year after year, to destroy the manpower and break the magnificent courage and fighting spirit of the ill-equipped but determined forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Japanese people, even with their own unbalanced humor, could not fail to perceive the sardonic humor of the term "incident", and they then, with tragicomical deliberation, dubbed the campaign the "China Affair"—but never "war". So it is today.

But during all these years of their unavailing effort to conquer China and to bring about the surrender of the Chinese National Government those Japanese armed forces were using China as a training-ground in preparation for the greater war, already carefully planned, for their eventual conquest and intended permanent control of all so-called "Greater East Asia including the South Seas" and for the imposition upon the peoples of those far-flung areas of what Japan is pleased to refer to as the "New Order" and the "Co-Prosperity Sphere". We know what that flowery slogan "Co-Prosperity" means: it denotes absolute overlordship—economic, financial, political—for Japan's own purely selfish interests and the virtual enslavement of the peoples of those territories to do the bidding of their Japanese masters. This statement is not a figment of the imagination: it is based on practical experience in other regions already subjected to Japan's domination. Such a regime will be imposed in every area that may fall under Japan's domination.

During all this period of preparation the Japanese military machine has been steadily expanded and strengthened and trained to a knife-edge of war efficiency—in landing on beaches, in jungle fighting, and in all the many different forms of warfare which it was later to

encounter. The jealous personal disputes, endless red tape, and face-saving expedients which characterize the civil life of Japan in times of peace wholly disappear in war; the various branches of their armed forces cooperate in well-nigh perfect coordination, and their staff work, strategy, and tactics are of a high degree of excellence. The precision and speed of their campaign in the Malay Peninsula and their rapid taking of Singapore are sufficient proof of that. Furthermore, in war Japan is wholly totalitarian; her economy is planned and carried out to the last detail. No word of criticism of the Government or its acts is tolerated; the so-called "thought control" police take care of that. Labor unions are powerless. In war Japan is a unit, thinks and acts as a unit, labors and fights as a unit.

With that background, and having in mind the strength and power of Japan even before Pearl Harbor, consider for a moment the scene as it has developed in the Far East. Consider the tremendous holdings of Japan today: Korea, Manchuria, great areas in China proper, Formosa, the Spratly Islands, Indochina, Thailand, Burma and the Andamans, the entire Malay Peninsula, Hongkong and Singapore, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and, farther to the south and to the east, myriads of islands many of which are unsinkable aircraft carriers.

Those areas contain all—mind you, all—the raw materials essential to the development of national power: rubber, oil, tin, metals, and foodstuffs—everything that the most comprehensive economy can desire; and they contain furthermore millions of native inhabitants who, experience has proved beyond peradventure, will be enslaved as skilled and unskilled labor by Japan to process those raw materials for immediate and future use. Add to that the stores of scrap iron for the making of steel which have been accumulating these many years in the Japanese homeland and the further stores acquired in the many conquered and occupied ports. There you have a recipe and the ingredients for national strength and power that defeat the imagination even approximately to assess.

Now to this recipe and these ingredients add one further element of grimly ominous purport. During all my 10 years in Japan I have read the books, the speeches, the newspaper and magazine articles of highly placed Japanese, of generals and admirals, of statesmen and diplomats and politicians. Sometimes thinly veiled, sometimes not even veiled, has emerged their overweening ambition eventually to invade and to conquer these United States. In their thinking, even the megalomania of Hitler is surpassed. Fantastic if you will, but to them it is not fantastic. It was not fantastic when the foremost Japanese admiral, as recently occurred, publicly stated in all seriousness that he intends that the peace after this war will be dictated in the White House in Washington—by Japan.

It might be 1 year or 2 years or 5 or 10 years before that Japanese military machine would find itself ready to undertake an all-out attack on this Western Hemisphere of ours; they themselves have spoken of a hundred-year war; but one fact is as certain as the law of gravity: if we should allow the Japanese to dig in permanently in the far-flung areas now occupied, if we should allow them to consolidate and to crystallize their ill-gotten gains, if we should allow them time to fortify those gains to the nth degree, as they assuredly will attempt to do, it would be only a question of time before they attempted the conquest of American territory nearer home.

What worries me in the attitude of our fellow countrymen is first the utterly fallacious pre-war thinking which still widely persists, to the effect that the Japanese, a race of little men, good copyists but poor inventors, are incapable of developing such power as could ever seriously threaten our home shores, our cities, and our homes, a habit of mind which is reinforced by the great distances separating our homeland from the eastern and southern battlefronts to-day. Second, I am worried by the reaction of our people to the current successes of our heroic fighting men in the Solomons and New Guinea, for after each hard-won victory the spirits of our people soar. Moral stimulation is good; but moral complacency is the most dangerous

habit of mind we can develop, and that danger is serious and ever-present. For 10 years I have watched the aggression of Japan against her neighbors, and her spoliation of American life and property, and I say to you, without hesitation or reserve, that our own country, our cities, our homes are in dire peril from the overweening ambition and the potential power of that Japanese military machine—a power that renders Japan potentially the strongest nation in the world, potentially stronger than Great Britain or Germany or Russia or the United States—and that only when that military caste and its machine have been wholly crushed and destroyed on the field of battle, by land and air and sea, and discredited in the eyes of its own people, and rendered impotent either to fight further or further to reproduce itself in the future, shall we in our own land be free from that hideous danger and be able once again to turn to paths of peace.

Here in Nashville we feel ourselves sheltered by the continental power of the United States. Land guarded by a vigilant army of citizen soldiers, neighboring waters sheltered by one of the mightiest navies in the world, airways patrolled by an incomparable air force—such a situation promises security. Let us not forget that the engines of war are only tools in the hands of men. However strong our defenses may be, defense cannot win a war. Indeed, a spirit of defense may discount the offensive and thus prepare the way to defeat.

Despite our shelter here in your beautiful city, let us not forget the spirit of Andrew Jackson—the spirit of democracy with a gun! We cannot and will not wait for the war to cross the waters and devastate our beautiful America; and if we do not await the enemy here, amidst our own homes, we must send our men overseas to attack the enemy in foreign lands—preferably his own lands. To fight their battles abroad, our men must be supplied with all the necessities of war; we at home have the added strain of maintaining communications lines across the greatest oceans of the world. More than this, we are fighting a war with allies; we have the complications of really dynamic in-

ternational relations; we face the grave weight of world-wide political responsibility!

It is at this point that the civic unity of which I have spoken to you is most urgently needed. Wartime does not allow the luxury of formal or theoretical dissension: matters which can and ought to be the subjects of Nation-wide debate in time of peace can and must be immediate decisions in time of war. Civic unity—a trust in one another and in allied peoples—demands a powerful inward self-discipline.

Our enemies are united in Japan. They are united by a cult of Japan-worship, by profound reverence for the majesty of their own institutions. The fanaticism, the frugality of speech no less than of materials, and the orderliness of Japan are things which serve that Empire well. We too must be worthy of our enemies and worthy of the immense tasks ahead; we must present closed ranks to the world. We must show that democracy can be—for a specific purpose and for a definable time—as monolithic as dictatorship.

In Germany our enemies are also united. German unity rests, like the Japanese, in part

on tradition, in part on patriotism; but, unlike the Japanese, it also rests on fear. The German people are intimidated by their own government. They are afraid of the uncertainties of defeat. If they behold an America which is united and which is nevertheless free, do you not feel sure that the German common people will be more inclined to accept the peace of the four freedoms?

At this hour, facing enemies greater than we have ever faced before, we Americans will show the world what our political system means. We will show all nations the spectacle of a free people voluntarily united, voluntarily producing, giving, fighting. We will show that our freedom of speech can be made wholly productive and that our freedom of press can be real and at the same time open not the slightest fissure to sedition, discontent, or defeatism. We will show the Germans and the Japanese the power of a moral, civic people, fighting in the harness of complete and purposeful alliance with all other free peoples. Each of you has his task in this struggle, and I know that each of you will try to excel his fellow men only in the rivalry of common sacrifice!

Commercial Policy

THE RECIPROCAL-TRADE-AGREEMENTS PROGRAM IN WAR AND PEACE

The reciprocal-trade-agreements program is based upon the Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934, which has twice been extended by Congress for additional 3-year periods, from June 12, 1937 to June 12, 1940 and again from June 12, 1940 to June 12, 1943. Further extension of this program will be considered by the Seventy-eighth Congress.

WHY IT WAS ADOPTED

Purpose

To increase foreign markets for products of the United States is the primary purpose of the trade-agreements program. This purpose

is sought through reciprocal adjustment of excessive trade barriers. The general objectives of the program are to substitute economic co-operation for economic warfare in our relations with other countries; to give economic substance to our good-neighbor policy; and to create the kind of international economic relations upon which a structure of durable peace can be erected.

Necessity

Normally the United States can and does produce more of a great number of farm and industrial products than can profitably be sold in the American market.

When large quantities of such goods cannot be exported, our agricultural products pile up in unmarketable surpluses and our industrial production slows down. The result is felt throughout the country in depressed prices, unemployment, reduced wages, and poorer home markets for American producers.

Trade between nations declined sharply after 1929, largely because most nations, including the United States, set up excessive barriers against imports. By thus making it difficult for its people to buy things they needed and desired from other countries, each country made it difficult—in many cases impossible—for its own producers to sell their exportable surpluses in other countries.

The value of the foreign trade of the United States fell even more rapidly than did that of the world as a whole; it dropped from \$9,640,000,000 in 1929 to \$2,934,000,000 in 1932.

As world trade diminished, employment and incomes fell and the world-wide economic depression was deepened and prolonged. Between 1929 and 1932 our foreign trade dropped nearly 70 percent; national income, 43 percent; cash farm income, 58 percent; wages and salaries in manufacturing industries, 53 percent.

Benefits of Foreign Trade

Expansion of our trade with foreign countries benefits the whole country:

1. It benefits directly the great branches of American agriculture and the many industries, large and small, that have products to sell in foreign markets.

2. It benefits directly American producers who use imported raw materials or semi-manufactured products in making their finished products.

3. It benefits millions of workers dependent upon these branches of agriculture and industry for their livelihood.

4. It improves domestic markets for American producers not directly interested in export or import trade; American farmers and manufacturers who can sell more of their goods in foreign markets—and their

employees as well—are better customers for the goods and services of Americans not in the business of exporting or importing.

5. It raises living standards by providing more employment, more purchasing power, and more goods for American consumers at reasonable prices; it increases, to our mutual advantage, the exchange of products we grow or manufacture to better advantage than other countries, for products that other countries can grow or manufacture to better advantage than we can.

Foreign Trade Is Two-Way

Foreign trade *necessarily* is two-way trade. We cannot export unless we import; we cannot import unless we export. Our exports provide purchasing power for the things we import; our imports provide purchasing power to foreign countries for the things they buy from us. People in foreign countries can buy our products only to the extent that they can acquire United States dollars to pay for them, and the only way they can acquire dollars is through the sale in this country of their products (including gold and silver) and services or by borrowing. Loans, even if available to them, merely postpone the ultimate necessity for payment in the form of commodities or services. If such payment is prevented, defaulted debts are inevitable.

HOW THE PROGRAM WORKS

Direct negotiation with other countries is the method prescribed by the Trade Agreements Act for reducing excessive barriers standing in the way of expansion of our foreign trade. This method was chosen as more practicable and more effective than general downward revision of the United States tariff alone. Even if feasible, such a revision would not insure the reciprocal reduction by other countries of their tariffs and other barriers, including discriminations, against our export trade.

Method

Specifically, the act empowers the President, in order to obtain from other countries conces-

sions on American exports, to modify excessive United States tariff rates, to bind existing tariff rates against increase, and to guarantee continued duty-free entry of products now on the free list.

The act does *not* empower the President to modify tariff rates except under a trade agreement; it does *not* empower him to reduce the duty on any foreign product under a trade agreement by more than 50 percent or to transfer any item from the dutiable list to the free list.

It *does* require that trade agreements be concluded only after the President has sought the advice of the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Commerce, the Tariff Commission, and other appropriate agencies of the Government, and only after public notice and full opportunity for presentation of information and views by any interested person.

All Government agencies concerned with foreign commerce cooperate, through interdepartmental committees, in studying all pertinent facts and views. Before any trade agreement is concluded, public notice is given of all products on which concessions by the United States will be considered and public hearings are held by representatives of the Government agencies concerned. Resulting recommendations in regard to trade agreements are submitted to the President through the Secretary of State.

Concessions Obtained

The United States, in negotiating a trade agreement, asks a foreign country to lower its excessive tariff rates on our exports, or to liberalize quota or exchange restrictions on them.

Such concessions and assurances against higher trade barriers have been obtained from countries which are important customers for thousands of American products, both agricultural and non-agricultural, comprising one third of all United States exports.

Concessions Granted

Under trade agreements the United States has agreed to tariff reductions or to the continuance of existing tariffs or free entry in the

case of imported products needed or desired by American producers and consumers. Concessions are granted on imported products more or less similar to those produced in the United States when they are in the national interest and when reciprocal concessions are obtained in return—but only after exhaustive study has indicated that such concessions will not cause serious injury to American producers. In appropriate cases imports of such products permitted to enter at the reduced tariff rates are limited in amount or restricted to seasons when similar American products are not marketed in quantities sufficient to satisfy the needs of American consumers.

"Most-Favored-Nation" Clause

The traditional trade policy of the United States is not to discriminate between foreign nations but to extend equality of tariff treatment to all who do not discriminate against the trade of this country. This policy is embodied in the Trade Agreements Act. Under it a lower rate of duty on a given product in a trade agreement with a foreign nation (other than Cuba) applies also to the same product from any third nation, unless that third nation is found to discriminate against the products of the United States. This policy enables the United States to require other countries, as well as the other party to the trade agreement, to give our exports non-discriminatory treatment.

This policy of fair treatment on a reciprocal basis pays large dividends in dollars and cents to American producers who are thus protected against foreign tariff and other discriminations. It promotes peaceful commercial relations. Discriminatory trade policies create resentment and invite retaliation.

BENEFICIAL RESULTS OF THE PROGRAM

The United States has concluded agreements with 26 foreign countries. These countries, in the order in which the agreements were signed, are: Cuba, Brazil, Belgium, and Luxembourg, Haiti, Sweden, Colombia, Canada, Honduras,

the Netherlands, Switzerland, Nicaragua,¹ Guatemala, France, Finland, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Czechoslovakia,² Ecuador, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Turkey, Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, and Mexico.

About 65 percent of the total foreign trade of the United States is carried on with the countries with which reciprocal trade agreements have been concluded. The United Kingdom and Canada are, respectively, the largest and the second largest customers for American exports.

Agreements With American Republics

Trade agreements have been concluded with all the other American republics except Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Paraguay. Negotiations with Bolivia are under way. Over 90 percent of the trade of the United States with the other American republics is with the trade-agreement countries.

Trade Increases

The trade-agreements program contributed substantially to the increase in United States foreign trade between the inauguration of the program and the outbreak of war in 1939. Other factors have also, of course, affected the volume and the nature of our trade.

During the 2-year period 1934-35 United States total foreign trade averaged 4.1 billion dollars a year. In the 2-year period 1938-39 the average was 5.3 billion dollars.

The contribution of the trade-agreements program to the increase in our foreign trade is indicated by a comparison of United States trade with agreement and with non-agreement countries.

In the 2-year period 1938-39, when 16 trade agreements were in effect, United States exports to the countries covered by these agree-

ments averaged 62.8 percent greater than in 1934-35, when only 1 agreement was in effect for a year or more. In 1938-39 our exports to all other countries were only 31.2 percent greater than in 1934-35.

Our imports from the 16 agreement countries averaged 21.6 percent greater in 1938-39 than in 1934-35, but our imports from other countries averaged only 11.1 percent greater.

These comparisons reinforce the common-sense conclusion that the reduction of excessive tariffs and other barriers to the exchange of our goods for those of other nations tends to support and enlarge our foreign trade.

Improved Trade Relations

Trade agreements improve trade relations generally between the United States and the foreign country concerned. The agreements themselves provide a basis for consultation in regard to matters dealt with in the agreements. Beyond this the cordial atmosphere fostered by the agreements paves the way for friendly discussion of other trade and economic matters not directly involved in the agreements.

Improved General Relations

Economic cooperation through mutually beneficial trade agreements tends to promote good relations with other countries. The trade-agreements program has helped us to win back, to our great advantage, some of the friendships we lost by our short-sighted tariff and war-debt policies after the last war. Today the trade agreements with the other American republics are one of the strongest pillars in the structure of hemispheric solidarity and of our global good-neighbor policy.

THE PROGRAM IN WAR AND PEACE

During the War

Our existing trade agreements with the United Kingdom and Canada entered into force on January 1, 1939, the year in which war began

¹The reciprocal duty concessions and certain provisions of this agreement ceased to be effective Mar. 10, 1938.

²The operation of this agreement was suspended Apr. 22, 1939.

in Europe. The agreement with Turkey took effect in May of that year. During the war period five new agreements have become effective with: Venezuela in December 1939; Argentina in November 1941; Peru in July 1942; Uruguay on January 1, 1943; and Mexico on January 30, 1943. During this period four supplementary agreements (two each with Canada and Cuba) were concluded.

Wartime trade controls, scarcity of shipping, and military considerations have come to dominate the nature and extent of our foreign trade. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of trade continues to be influenced primarily by economic considerations. The trade-agreements program exerts a beneficial influence on our trade relations with friendly countries and on our own war effort.

The agreements provide valuable insurance, now, against a repetition of the tidal wave of trade barriers and discriminations that swept over the world after the last war. They provide, now, a solid foundation for resumption of mutually beneficial trade after the war, when so many of our agricultural and industrial producers will need foreign markets if they are to avoid curtailment of production and ruinously low prices, and when American industry and consumers will need imported raw materials and semi-manufactured and finished products.

Trade agreements, old as well as new, help to bring about close economic cooperation between this country and the other United Nations in the joint effort to achieve complete victory. These agreements stand today for economic cooperation in war and in peace—for a world in which men everywhere can produce in accordance with their ability and exchange their goods on a fair and reasonable basis. For this reason, an active trade-agreements program during the war strengthens the determination of the United Nations to win a victory that will be worth the cost; it inspires confidence that the United States will do its share in creating conditions favorable to prosperity and security after victory.

After the War

Secure peace after victory must be built upon the solid foundation of economic cooperation. Economic insecurity and social unrest, caused in considerable part by excessive trade barriers and discriminatory trade policies, helped to spawn a Hitler and to plunge the world into this greatest of all wars before it had recovered from the last one. After this war, economic cooperation, not economic warfare, must be the rule.

The governments of the United Nations, in subscribing to the Atlantic Charter, agreed "to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity"; and affirmed their "desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security".

In article VII of the mutual-aid (lend-lease) agreement of February 23, 1942 the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom agreed that "In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction

of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives" of the Atlantic Charter.

Similar article-VII provisions are contained in mutual-aid agreements with China, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Poland, the Netherlands, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Norway, and Yugoslavia. Australia and New Zealand have accepted these principles, and Canada, although not a recipient of lend-lease aid, has subscribed to them.

The trade-agreements program, if extended by the Congress prior to June 12, 1943, will be one of the most effective means of applying, in cooperation with other countries, these agreed-upon principles for the attainment of the economic basis of an enduring peace.

International Conferences, Commissions, Etc.

COLOMBIAN-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON RUBBER

[Released to the press February 19]

Under an exchange of notes recently completed in Bogotá between the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia and the American Ambassador, a Colombian-American commission has been established and charged with the direction of general policy with respect to the procurement of rubber in Colombia. The commission is composed of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Economy, and the Manager of the Caja de Credito Agrario Industrial y Minero, representing the Colombian Government, and the American Ambassador, the Special Representative in Colombia of the Rubber Reserve Company, and the Special Representative in Colombia of the Board of Economic Warfare, representing the Government of the United States.

Cultural Relations

DISTINGUISHED VISITORS FROM OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS

[Released to the press February 19]

Dr. Benjamín Subercaseaux, professor of psychology at the University of Chile and well-known writer, is expected to arrive in Washington February 22, at the invitation of the Department of State. During his travels in the United States he plans to gather material for a book on life and opinion in this country. Consequently his itinerary will include not only cultural centers, publishing houses, and newspapers but also small towns and representative regions in different areas where he can see the average citizen of the United States in his daily activities.

[Released to the press February 20]

Father Luis Alberto Tapia, one of the most widely known ecclesiastics and educators of Bolivia, arrived in Washington February 19. While in this country he will be the guest of the Department of State. He will spend several weeks in Washington and later expects to make a trip to the West Coast.

The Department

APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS

Mr. Henry R. Labouisse, Jr., has been designated Chief of the Division of Defense Materials, effective as of February 1, 1943 (Departmental Order 1135).

Treaty Information

ARMED FORCES

Agreements Regarding the Service of Nationals of One Country in the Armed Forces of Another Country

[Released to the press February 16]

A list of agreements in effect with co-belligerent countries, with the effective date of each, regarding the services of nationals of one country in the armed forces of the other country follows:

Australia, July 18, 1942
Belgium, August 4, 1942
Canada, April 6, 1942
Cuba, January 11, 1943
India, May 27, 1942
Mexico, January 22, 1943
New Zealand, July 2, 1942
Netherlands, July 8, 1942
Norway, December 24, 1942
Poland, January 27, 1943
Union of South Africa, June 11, 1942
United Kingdom, April 30, 1942
Yugoslavia, May 18, 1942

The text of the agreement with Canada was printed in the BULLETIN of April 11, 1942, page 315; that with Cuba, in the BULLETIN of February 13, 1943, page 157; that with Mexico, in the BULLETIN of January 23, 1943, page 87. With the exception of the agreement with Mexico, all others listed above are identical in content.

TRANSIT

Agreement With Peru Providing Air- Transportation Facilities

[Released to the press February 19]

Supplementing the rubber agreement entered into April 23, 1942 between the Governments of Peru and of the United States, an agreement was signed on February 18, 1943 by the Defense Supplies Corporation, a Reconstruction Finance Corporation subsidiary, and the Government of Peru, providing for an air-transportation network to facilitate the rubber program. The agreement signed contemplates the financing by Defense Supplies Corporation of the construction of certain airport facilities, the supplying of certain airplanes, and the improvement of communication facilities in the remote rubber areas.

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